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Abstract: JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises) 
program was implemented as a part of the EU cohesion policy in the framework of 
2007-2013 programming period. The primary objective of the program was to 
enhance the financing prospects of SME’s through structural funds that provide 
financial engineering instruments like loan, guarantee and venture capital. This 
paper focuses on the effects of JEREMIE on Hungary’s venture capital market. 
Since 2010, 28 JEREMIE backed venture capital funds were founded in four 
rounds and 130 billion HUF capital was allocated into these funds with the 
contribution of Hungarian government. A well-established venture capital market 
can boost entrepreneurship and innovation, therefore economic growth which is 
the foundation of government involvement. On the other hand, there is an 
extensive literature highlighting the limits and possible drawbacks of the active role 
of public sector in the venture capital market. There is a consensus in the literature 
that in the long run the extensive role of government in venture capital industry is 
counterproductive. Substituting market participants by government agencies will 
hardly result in a competitive and efficient market. However, temporarily as a 
catalyst public sector can contribute to the development of venture capital market. 
Direct government intervention supportable temporarily only in the infancy of the 
industry. The primary objective of every program must be to develop the market to 
the level where it becomes self-sustaining. This way the success of these 
programs must not be measured only by the amount of invested capital, financial 
performance of venture capital funds and venture capital backed companies. 
Raising private sector awareness and the progress of necessary institutions are 
also the criteria of a successful program. During the design and implementation of 
venture capital agendas these aspects must be taken into consideration. This 
paper aims for evaluating how successful JEREMIE program is in enhancing the 
development of venture capital industry.  
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1. Why should and why shouldn’t the public sector play a role in VC market? 
Venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) industry in Hungary emerged in the 
early 1990’s shortly after the economic transition and developed at a steady pace. 
In terms of invested capital Hungarian private equity industry was well-developed 
compared to EU and Central and Eastern European countries. However, this fact 
was led by buyouts; traditional VC investments meant only a tiny fraction of the 
private equity market. This paper focuses on traditional VC, the equity-like 
financing of young and innovative enterprises by institutional investors. Financing 
of the early stages of these enterprises via VC had fallen far below the EU average 
in Hungary before the JEREMIE backed VC funds appeared in 2010. 
The financing of these young innovative firms with great growth potential plays a 
crucial role in the development of a healthy entrepreneurial sector, but as a result 
of the special characteristics of these enterprises, the necessary financial sources 
are not always available for them. Szerb (2006) shows that, firms in different 
stages of their life have access to different types of financial resources, and their 
demand for finance increases rapidly at special points. Financing gaps occur when 
there are not enough funds for financing firms that have great growth potential, at a 
given stage of their life. These gaps usually occur at seed, early and early 
expansion stages and at startup companies (Nagy, 2004). One reason of 
insufficient funds for young and innovative firms is that the 3F (family, friends and 
founders) doesn’t have the necessary resources to finance the further development 
of their company, but they are not suitable for bank financing. They don’t have 
collaterals, their capitalization is low compared to their financial needs and they 
don’t have any track record. The imperfections of market can also lead to the lack 
of financial supply for startup firms. These imperfections are the moral hazard 
problems described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and asymmetric information 
demonstrated first by Akerlof (1970). 
 
Figure 1: Venture capital investments in European countries as a percentage of 
GDP (2007-2012) 
Source: EVCA (2013 
 
Figure 1. shows the VC investments as a share of GDP in 22 European countries 
in the 2007-2012 period. According to its ratio to the GDP, VC played the most 
important role in the Northern European countries and accounted for only 0,01% - 
0,03% in the Central and Eastern European countries before the recession at 
2008. In the given period in correlation with the total investments, VC decreased in 
every country except for Hungary. This asset class proved to be very sensitive to 
economic cycles; in average it decreased almost by 50% from 2007 to 2012. 
Contrary to the declining European trend, in Hungary VC investments increased to 
0,066% of the GDP which was the highest ratio in 2012 in Europe. The cause of 
this pro-cyclical movement in case of Hungary is the increasing role of public sector 
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in VC industry and the appearance of EU’s financial sources in the form of 
JEREMIE VC funds. 
The importance of VC in enhancing innovation and this way its spurring effect on 
economic growth is the reason of public sector efforts for promoting this asset 
class. Kortum and Lerner (2000) showed by examining patenting activity, that 
venture capital investments increased patenting three times more than the 
financing of traditional corporate R&D activity. The real question is, whether 
governments can effectively promote entrepreneurship via intervening in the VC 
industry. There is no consensus about the question of government effectiveness in 
VC market. An extensive literature highlights the limits and possible drawbacks of 
the active role of government. There are two types of public sector involvement; it 
can affect the market directly or indirectly. Direct intervention is when government 
invests in funds or manages them. Governments also have the tools to influence 
VC markets indirectly. Taxation, legal environment, public R&D spending, 
regulation, financial market liberalization are areas that have huge effect on VC 
industry, mainly affecting the demand side of VC. Through JEREMIE the public 
sector directly affects the VC market via funding VC firms in a hybrid public and 
private framework and supervising them, therefore this paper focuses on the direct 
involvement of the government. For a more detailed discussion of indirect 
involvement see; Da Rin et al. (2006), Lerner and Tåg (2013). 
A possible drawback of public investment is that it crowds out private investors. 
Leleux and Surlemont (2003) examined the crowd-out effect of public sector 
involvement in case of VC and according to their results public involvement does 
not crowd out private investments, on the contrary it increases the amount of 
capital invested in the VC industry. They also found that large public involvement 
was more typical in case of smaller, less developed VC markets. Crowd-out effect 
is typical when a market reaches its optimal level by private investors. In case of an 
infant VC market like the Hungarian, as a result of the lack of necessary 
institutional environment and market imperfections the capital allocation to VC 
industry is not optimal and there are not enough funds for young, innovative firms. 
Temporarily public sector involvement in the VC industry may appear without the 
crowd-out effect, but just in its developing stage. The more developed a country’s 
VC market is, the less justified the government involvement is (Karsai, 2002). 
Kelly (2011) compared the returns of VC funds in the United States and Europe 
and found that the European returns are below the US returns. One reason of this 
weaker performance is that European market is in its development stage compared 
to the US market and it have not yet reached the critical mass to work effectively. 
VC investments have positive externalities for their peers, hence the more VC firms 
operate in an area, the more developed their environment is with regards to VC 
industry (Lerner, 2009). First of all VC market must reach the critical mass to 
develop the institutional environment that is necessary to an effective industry 
(Lerner and Tåg, 2013). Government activities can play an important role in 
creating and formulating the institutional environment and attracting market 
participants to VC industry via special incentives. In case of a young and less 
developed VC market public sector interventions can help the industry to reach its 
critical mass. In theory this seems like a valid reasoning, but in the real world this 
issue is more complex. What is the point, where a VC market considered being 
mature and self-sustaining? In spite of the spurring purpose of direct public sector 
intervention it can easily become a setback of development. To minimize this 
negative effect, government agendas must also have an exit strategy. From the 
beginning the goals of any program must be clear and government must plan not 
just for the implementation of the program but also for the withdrawal from VC 
market. 
A possible drawback of public sector involvement can be that it increases the moral 
hazard of investments. Moral hazard issue runs deeply in case of VC. Sahlman 
(1990) describes the double moral hazard problem of VC investments. There is a 
two-level principal-agent relationship, where in terms of its relationship with the 
portfolio companies the VC firm is the principal, and in terms of its relationship with 
the investors the VC firm is the agent. The consequence of moral hazard problem 
in principal-agent relationship is that the efforts of agent to maximize its utility are 
not optimal for the principal. This way the agent is not acting on behalf of the 
principal and the relationship reaches less likely its original goal. In case of 
government backed VC funds this problem is more complex. The exposure of 
public sector to the issues of moral hazard and principal-agent problem is extended 
and diversified (Lane, 2000). When instead of private investors there is a 
government agency that finances VC funds than a multi-level principal-agent 
relationship evolves. As a result of these problems government involvement in the 
VC industry can lead to counterproductive actions, like financing companies out of 
the target group or financing firms with affiliations to the agent. These negative 
effects mostly depend on the ability of institutional environment on enforcing 
accountability. 
Lerner (2009) examined government efforts to boost VC market and 
entrepreneurship and found that most of these efforts were in vain and the failures 
were originated in the design of the programs. Public sector involvement in the VC 
industry is not unprecedented in Hungary. Former attempts failed to understand the 
VC method, the firms and funds created by the public sector lacked the features of 
VC. Public sector backed firms financed primarily companies in traditional 
industries, they had different exit approach, provided debt-like financing instead of 
equity-like financing and they were not involved in the operation of enterprises 
(Karsai, 2006). These characteristics of VC are necessary in creating a consistent 
system that can effectively spur entrepreneurship and innovation. Exit approach 
plays a crucial role in VC investments. VC’s can realize profit via exiting their 
portfolio companies so they must have an exit strategy from the beginning of an 
investment or even before they invest into a company (Becsky-Nagy, 2006). VC’s 
invest into young and smaller-sized enterprises but exiting companies via IPO or 
M&A is not possible profitably unless they reach a given size due to the economies 
of scale. As a consequence of the limited life of VC funds companies must have 
great growth potential to reach the size on a short run, where an exit can be 
profitable. Growth potential varies across industries (Greiner, 1998); companies in 
traditional industries have a lower growth rate in average, while companies in high-
tech or biotech industry are able to grow more rapidly. That is the main reason why 
they can attract VC investments and why VC is associated with a few industries. As 
a consequence of this specialization VC’s obtains special expertise and create 
networks that they can utilize in the selection of portfolio companies and in the 
further co-operation with them. Chemmanur et al. (2011) shows that, the non-
financial value added services offered by VC’s effectively increase the value of 
portfolio companies this way enhance the chance of successful exit. As we can see 
the features of VC follows from each other and they are parts of a consistent 
system. The understanding of VC method must be the first step in the planning of a 
VC agenda. The former efforts in Hungary were inconsistent with the VC method. 
These programs as a result of poor design failed to attract investors to the VC 
industry and they could not promote young innovative firms. On the other hand 
JEREMIE breaks with the previous government agendas and it is an important step 
forward. In the following sections the paper will describe the Hungarian JEREMIE 
VC program and its early results. 
 
2. Hungarian JEREMIE venture capital program 
 
2.1. Structure of funds 
JEREMIE VC funds appeared in 2010 in Hungary. Figure 2. shows the basic 
structure of the program. The financial resources of JEREMIE are mainly from EU 
(85%) with Hungarian government contribution (15%). This capital is managed by 
Venture Finance Hungary PLC (VFH). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Structure of JEREMIE VC program 
Source: author’s illustration, Venture Finance Hungary PLC (2013) 
 
The key element of the program is that it draws in private sector participants; 
investors and VC firms. As it was discussed above the lack of understanding of VC 
method by government can lead to the failure of the programs designed to 
stimulate innovation and entrepreneurship by spurring VC. This negative effect can 
be eliminated by the partnership of public and private sector that we can see in 
case of JEREMIE. VFH allocates capital to VC firms from private sector with an 
open tender procedure. Instead of the government agency private VC firms invest 
into companies and monitors their operation, VFH only supervises them. To meet 
the requirements of the tender VC firms had to employ experienced senior 
investors. With the participation of such investors the non-financial value added of 
VC can be increased. 
On the other hand private sector investors also play an essential role in JEREMIE. 
There are two fund-structures in the program; co-investment and joint fund. In case 
of joint fund public sector funds must be supplemented by private sector 
investments in a 70%-30% compound. The other structure in the program is co-
 
Venture Finance Hungary 
PLC 
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tion 
 
15 % Hungarian 
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VC firms with joint fund structure 
30% private investor + 70% VFH 
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Private 
investors 
VC firms with co-investment 
structure 
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portfolio companies 
invested by private investor (30%) and VC firm (70%) 
portfolio companies 
invested by VC firms (100%) 
investment. In this set-up the VC fund itself is financed by VFH in a 100%, but each 
investment must be implemented in co-operation with private investors also in a 
70%-30% compound. There are incentives built in the program that draws private 
sector investors in. There is a profit ceiling for public sector investment set to the 
benchmark interest rate of the EU. Above that level private investors are entitled to 
the profit of the VC funds. In case of profitable operation as a result of this leverage 
private investors can nearly triple their profits. On the other hand losses are 
mitigated, 5% of losses are taken over by the public sector. 
The advantage of different structures of the funds is that it mobilizes different 
participants of VC industry. While investing into joint funds is preferable for 
institutional investors because of the larger-scale funding requirements, co-
investment structure can attract other segments of VC market like business angels, 
serial-entrepreneurs or other VC firms specialized in smaller-scale investments. VC 
industry and its effectiveness is dependent upon these market participants. 
Institutional VC investors focus is more on the early and early expansion stages, 
while seed investments play a less important role in VC portfolios (Metrick, 2007). 
Also due economies of scale companies with lower funding needs are less likely to 
get VC funding. These are the pre-VC stages of young, innovative enterprises and 
the survival and development of firms in this period affects the demand side of 
institutional VC industry. Madill et al. (2005) showed that 57% of companies that 
received business angel financing also received VC financing, while only 10% of 
VC backed companies had not obtained business angel funding. The result of 
funding gaps in the pre-VC ready stages will be the inadequate number of 
investment possibilities for VC. Informal VC is a missing link in the chain of funding 
sources in Hungary (Makra, 2004) that affects negatively the number of VC-ready 
enterprises. Co-investment structure could mobilize these market participants 
hence develops the ecosystem of VC industry. 
The capital allocated into VC funds was low before JEREMIE. One reason is that 
legal environment and financial market regulations excluded domestic institutional 
investors from VC market until 2006 when the new capital-market regulation 
became effective (Karsai, 2007). Financial market deregulation and the 
appearance of pension funds proved to be a catalyst in many countries, for 
example in the USA in the early ’80 or in Sweden (Lerner and Tåg, 2013). From 
2006 although the regulation allowed it, institutional investors did not invest into 
this asset class. The future prospects of Hungarian VC market are not auspicious 
in face of the reversal of Hungarian pension reform. The windup of mandatory 
private pension scheme results in a hiatus of possible investors, which would be an 
indispensable pillar of a self-sustaining industry. As a result of missing institutional 
investors Hungarian VC is dependent on regional VC firms and foreign 
investments. 
 
2.2. Investment policy 
JEREMIE funds were founded in four different rounds and in each round with 
different characteristics. The main difference is in the focus of funds; 4 funds of the 
second round aim companies in their seed stage, the first round focuses mainly on 
early stage investments, while the other funds offer financing for companies in 
early expansion stages. Table 1. summarizes the specification of investment policy 
of VC firms dictated by the tender procedure. There are restrictions on the territory, 
age, revenue of the companies and on the size of investments. 
Table 1: Characteristics of JEREMIE VC funds investment policy 
Round JEREMIE I. JEREMIE II. 
JEREMI
E III. 
JEREMIE 
IV. 
Structure Co-
Investment 
Joint 
Fund 
Joint Fund 
Seed 
Joint Fund 
Expansion 
Joint Fund 
Expansion 
Joint Fund 
Expansion 
Number of 
Funds 
1 7 4 6 8 2 
Capital 
(billion HUF) 
7,1 40,9 8,56 32,1 34,2 8,6 
S
c
o
p
e
 
Territory 
Central-
Hungarian 
Region 
out of Central-Hungarian Region 
Age < 5 years < 5 years < 3 years < 5 years < 5 years < 5 years 
Revenue 
(billion 
HUF) 
< 1,5 < 1,5 < 0,2 < 5 < 5 < 5 
Maximum 
size of 
invest-
ment 
1,5 million EUR in a 
12 month period for 
no more than 3 
consecutive years 
(max. 4,5 million 
EUR/company) 
150 thousand 
EUR in a 12 
month period 
followed by a 
150 thousand 
EUR loan (max. 
300 million 
EUR/company) 
2,5 million EUR in a 12 month 
period 
Source: Venture Finance Hungary PLC (2013) 
 
The territorial restrictions derives from that JEREMIE was implemented as a part of 
EU’s regional development policy. Convergence of underdeveloped regions is one 
of the primary objectives of EU’s regional policy so the most developed Central-
Hungarian Region is out of the focus of the program. Only one fund was raised to 
invest in this region. While this objective might be reasonable in case of other 
instruments of JEREMIE like loan or guarantee program, but it is inconsistent with 
VC. VC aims the most developed areas, innovative industry clusters and it is highly 
concentrated (Metrick, 2007). According to the study of NESTA (2009) that 
examined the private and public hybrid funds of the UK, such regulation of 
investment policy kept government involvement from reaching its goal. Territorial 
restriction is a counterproductive measure of JEREMIE. Other negative effect of 
territorial limitation is that the co-investment fund operates only in the Central-
Hungarian Region therefore it cannot mobilize business angels in the whole 
country. It is true especially, if we take into consideration, that informal VC operates 
locally. 
In terms of young innovative firms, age and revenue restrictions of JEREMIE are 
soft so the funding of a wide range of enterprises is possible. In the time of 
investment, most companies are in pre-commercial stage and have no revenues 
(Chemmanur et al., 2011). The maximum size of investment is a very strong 
constraint (Papp, 2012), especially in case of the four JEREMIE II. joint seed funds. 
To invest the entire capital of seed funds, supposing that firms invest the maximum 
amount of money into a company, each VC firms should make 24 investment 
decisions. The managing of such a portfolio would be hardly possible even if there 
were enough investment opportunities. On the other hand the capital allocated into 
expansion funds is disproportionately low compared to the higher funding needs of 
this stage of companies. 
 
3. The early results of JEREMIE 
The investment period of JEREMIE ends at the end of 2015. The funds of 
JEREMIE III. and IV. have started their operation only at the end of 2013 and there 
are no empirical evidences about their performance. On the other hand, more than 
80 investments were made by JEREMIE I. funds. Originally, the end of investment 
period of JEREMIE I. was the end of 2013 but it was prolonged until the end of 
2015. The reason of this prolongation is the low rate of investment. VC funds had 
made decision only about 66% of their capital (Garamvölgyi, 2014) and the 
effective disbursement was even lower until the end of 2013. One reason is that 
the demand side of VC is not ready for the amount of capital accumulated in 
JEREMIE; there is a shortage in the number of VC-ready companies. Harmonized 
government efforts in areas, like business incubation and development of 
entrepreneurial ecosystem are necessary for the progress of VC industry. 
Technology transfer policies could also stimulate the demand side of VC, but in 
case of Hungary as a result of the informational gap between VC’s and spin-off 
companies the role of VC in this area is not significant (Becsky-Nagy, 2013). 
Recently we can see government effort aiming the development of these areas like 
the establishment of business incubators by National Innovation Office. Also the 
seed focus of 4 JEREMIE II. funds aims to stimulate diverse segments of 
enterprises. In the development of young innovative firms VC plays an important 
role, but it is part of a system and dependent on other factors. This paper focuses 
on the supply side of VC market; the more detailed analysis of the demand side 
goes beyond this paper. The low rate of invested capital does not derive only from 
the insufficient amount of investment possibilities. As we can see in Figure 1., VC 
investments in Hungary is the highest in Europe even though that one third of the 
capital was not invested. The first round of JEREMIE seems to be oversized 
compared to the maximum investment into a company. 
Previous VC agendas failed to reach innovative firms (Karsai, 2007) whereas most 
companies obtained VC in JEREMIE represent this type of enterprises as a result 
of the VC method consistent operation of private VC firms. Until the end of 2013 
JEREMIE funds had invested into 82 companies. From the total of 82 VC-backed 
firms 37 companies are in the field of IT and communication, 16 are in biotech and 
healthcare industry (Garamvölgyi, 2014). Innovative firms dominate the portfolios of 
VC firms. 
To evaluate JEREMIE we have to take into consideration the financial performance 
of funds and firms and the affects of the program on the environment of VC 
industry. In case of financial performance a quantitative research, the observation 
of portfolio companies and the exits are necessary to evaluate the program. Up to 
the end of 2013 there is information about one successful exit and one firm that 
went bust, most companies still in private. The absence of early successful exits 
might be the sign of poor performance, but the more detailed assessment of the 
financial performance of JEREMIE would be premature, average investment time is 
less than 3 years yet. As it was mentioned before, the effects of government 
involvement on the ecosystem of VC is also an important criteria. Future qualitative 
researches should surveying the attitude of entrepreneurs and investors toward 
VC, their awareness of this asset class, development of contracting conditions and 
the activity of market participants of VC ecosystem. 
 
4. In conclusion 
There is an extensive literature discussing the different aspects of government 
interventions in the VC market. In the long run public sector involvement is not able 
to substitute market participants, still in the short run in case of infant VC industries 
government actions can be the catalysts of the development. Well designed 
program’s goal must be to attract private sector participants and not to substitute 
them. 
Previous attempts aiming the stimulation of young innovative enterprises via VC 
failed in Hungary as a result of poor design and the lack of private sector 
involvement. The greatest achievement of JEREMIE is that it has drawn in different 
market participants via the partnership of public and private sector.  
While the governing principal of the program is a significant step forward there are 
counterproductive and inconsistent restrictions in its implementation. Regional 
preferences and the limitation of the size investments are setbacks of the 
effectiveness. Also the size of funds and their composition with regards to their 
stage focus are miscalculated. 
It is the success of JEREIME that it could reach young innovative companies 
contrary to the previous government actions aiming the alleviation of the financing 
prospects of these enterprises and that it could attract private sector participants. 
The more detailed assessment of the results and performance of JEREMIE would 
be premature. The proper evaluation of this agenda will require the quantitative 
analyses of financial performance of VC-backed companies and VC funds as well 
as the qualitative research of the development of the ecosystem. 
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